

E. #1164

Doc. No. 2593-D (7)

Page 1

Item No. 8

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

725 (Part 1 of 3)

a
Concerning my #722.

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 b and 727 b). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

a - S.I.S. #24292 which states that meetings are being held with the Imperial Headquarters to consider a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America and that a final decision is to be made on the morning of the 5th.

b - Not available.

SECRET

24330

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#725 (Part 2 of 3)

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this--to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24331

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#725 (Part 3 of 3)

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end--at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations--the Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the concensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything ~~go~~ away, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24332

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats
of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric
or physical means, decrypted, and translated by
trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and
are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge
and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an
occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Dec 25 1937 (7)

Ex 1164

總

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九四一年十一月廿日

紫(0 A) (至急)

第七二五號(二ノ第一封)

一 往電第七二二號(註2)ニ關シテ

一 説テ、日米關係ハ真ノ破綻ニ煩シ、吾國民ハ國
交調整ノ可能性ニ信ヲ置カザル様ニナリツツア
リ。國策ノ根本万針ヲ審議スル爲、内閣ハ連日
大本營連絡會議ヲ繼續シ熟議ニ熟議ヲ重ネタル
結果故ニ政府及軍最高司令部一致ノ意見ニ基キ
日本侵涉事關ニ對スル反對運動ヲ擧起シ得ルニ
至レリ(第726號/註3)及第727號/註
4)ト載ク。本政策並ニ帝國ノ他ノ諸政策ニ
統テハ、五日午前開會議定ナル會議ノ確認ヲ待
ツモノナリ。

二 吾方帝國內外ノ事態ハ極メテ急迫ヲ告げ今ヤ延
期ヲ計サザル狀勢ニアルモ、日本帝國ト合衆國
トノ平和的友好關係ヲ維持セントスル誠意ヨリ
熟議ノ結果、今一度次が運営ヲ備ス事ニ決セリ。

Dec 25 1937 (7)

但本交渉ハ吾々最後ノ試ニシテ、名實共ニ此ノ反對極矣ハ、實ニ最後未ナリト御承知アリ度ク此ヲ以テシテ尙益速安結ニ到ラザルニ於テハ、遺憾ナガラ會議ハ決然ニ到ルノ外ナク、其ノ結果兩國友好關係ハ實ニ潭底ノ縁ニ墮ムノ已ムナキニ至ルモノナリ。即チ今次衝突ノ成否ハ帝國國連ニ甚大ナル影響アリ。實際、吾々ハ此ノ儀子ノ一端ニ吾方國土ノ運命ヲ賭セル次第ナリ。

註 8、日米關係改善ノ爲ノ根本万針考研ノ爲、大本營トノ間ニ會合開催サルベキ旨及最後的決定ハ五日前ナサレル旨ヲ述べタル S. I. S
第二四二九ニ號ヲ當ス。

手入シ得ズ。

2.

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」ヘ

一九四一年十一月四日

紫(04) (至急)

第七二五號(三ノ第ニ部)

日本會議場端ノ際、誰レカ其會議ノ斯ク承引クラ夢
想セシ。吾々ハ急速安結ヲ計ル爲、從來謀キラ忍ビ
テ該歩ニ該歩ヲ重ネ來リタルニ浦ラズ、合衆國ハ之
ニ對應スル所ナク、終始當初ノ提議ヲ固執シ居ル現
狀ニシテ我万朝野ニモ米國ノ誠意ニ疑惑ヲ感ズルモ
ノ咎ラザル議ナリ。武政府ハ凡ユル體調ノ崩壊的事
件ヲ忍ビ記述誠懇ヲ披瀝シテ更ニ該歩ヲ断テセリ。
然リ後等ニ對シ屢々スル迄ニ該歩セリ。

真ノ所以ノモノハ一ニ太平洋ノ平和維持ヲ頼念スル
ニ出ツルモノニシテ赤側一部ニ於テハ吾万ガ一万的
該歩ヲナサント欲セルガ如ク考ヘルモノアル如ク見
ユルモ、吾々ハ目前ハ騒氣ニ發スルニ非ズ、從ツテ
吾万ノ隣忍ニモ自ラ恨戻アリ、否吾々ノ左立ト憤戻
トハ必要ニヨリテハ犠牲ノ如何ヲ圖ハズ據譲セザル
ベカラザル次第ニシテ、合衆國ニシテ貳ノ上吾國ノ
立場ヲ無視シ、又ハ之ヲ過クルガ如キ隣戻ニ出ズル
ニ於テハ、交渉ヲ開始ハルモ何等益ナキニシテ今ヤ

Doc 25937 (7)
Jan. 8

吾々ハ能フ限リノ友誼的精祿ヲ發揮シ進テ能フ限リ
ノ讓歩ヲナシ以テ局面ノ平和的收拾ヲ計ラント欲ス
ルモノナリ。

4.

Dec 25/13 D (7)

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九四一年十一月廿日

紫（04）（至急）

第七二五號（三ノ第三部）

三 最後ノロ、即テ日米交渉ノ最後ノ日ニハ如何ナル事態ノ生ズルカニ愚ラ致シ合衆國政府ニ於テハ吾万ト和平ヲ締アコトノ如何ニ有故ナルヤラ又之ガ全世界ノ情勢ニ如何達良キカラ宣傳ニ考察サレル様哀心ヨリ要望スルヤ切ナリ。

四 如上ノ次第ニテ長大使ノ使命ノ如何ニ重大ナルカラ御承知セラレシ事ナラン。貴使ハ問題解決ノ鏡ラ漫ル重責ナル地位ニアリ、吾々ハ、吾方帝國國運進展ノ爲何事カ有故ナル事ヲ貴使ガナシ得ラルベシト大ナル希望ヲ與シテ居ル次第ナリ。此上共右詰點寫ト御諒承ノ上沈着以テ最善ヲ盡シテ御努力ヲ、繼續スル決意ヲ致サレ辰シ余ハ、實下力然致サレシコトヲ希望スルモノナリ。頃、會議終了次第其ノ旨實万ニ滿御致スペキニ付、其ノ上實万ニ於テハ「ルーズベルト」大統領及ビ「ハル」國務長官ト會見シ我方ノ決意ヲ徹底セシメ極力交渉ノ急務妥協ヲ計ラルル

Dec 25/18 D(7)
Oct. 8

様御勞アリ度シ。

五 是等會議ノ重大性ニ鑑ミ、實地ノ折衝ト並行シ
余モ亦當地ニ於テ接觸スベシ。

余ハ在京米國大使ト會議ヲ行フ際先ニ付言候ニ
於テハ米國官邊トノ會議ニヨリテ真ノ意見ノ趨
勢ヲ得次據當万ニ電報アリ度ク今後ノ交渉經過
ハ勿論實万ニ於テ新ナル措置ヲ取ル際ハ逐一報
告ノ上達裕ヲラレ度シ。右様ノ關係上手違ヒ
ヲ避ケル爲ニモ當万訓令ハ誦クマテ嚴守アリ且
當万訓令ハ實万ニ於テ取捨選擇ノ餘地ナキコト
ト御承知アリ度シ。

6.

Doc. 2593 cert-

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸軍省參謀本部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、
添附數通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ヘ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ
予ノ知リ且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲
メ西洋人ニトリ八力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ
典雅ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部付大佐

CARTER. W. CLARKE
カーティー・ダブリュー・クラーク

Doc. No. 2593-D (8)

Item No. 9

Page 1

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726

(Part 1 of 4.)

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our attempts to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistence as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement. "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expansion of our sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific..

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24334

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

726 (Part 2 of 4.)

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.
We are toning down our stipulations in this connection
as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China
since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some other sort of a statement.)

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24335

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726 (Part 3 of 4)

2. Explanation.

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

24336

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726 (Part 4 of 4)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24337

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Doc 2593D (8)
Date 11/16/1941

東京
原 京發
ワシントン宛

和

一九四一年ノ昭和十六年十一月四日

紫色 (CA) (至急)

第二二六號 (四、第一部)

甲案

一 本宗ハ九月二十五日、該方漫談ヲ既往ノ交渉經過ヨリ判明セル米國側ノ希望ニ當不得ル限り「ミ」トスル趣旨ヲ以テ修正セル最公宗ニシテ該方主張ヲ左記、通り候相セルモノナリ。

(一) 過去無差別問題

九月二十一日宗ニテ到底妥結ノ見込ナキ際ハ、
「日本國政府ハ無差別原則ヲ全世界ニ適用セラ
ルモノナルニ於テハ太平洋全地域自テ支那ニ
於テモ本原則ノ行ハルコトヲ承認ス」ヲ導入
ス。

(二) 三國同盟ノ解消及履行問題

該方ニ於テ自説權ノ範囲ヲ擴大スル意圖ナキコ
トヲ更ニ強調ニスルト共ニ、從來屢々説明セル
如ク該方ハ歐洲戰爭ノ太平洋ヘノ擴大ヲ避ケ反
キ希望ナル旨ヲ聲明サレ候シ。

1.

東京發祥號領宛

一九四一年十一月四日

紫色（C.A.）（至急）

第七二六號

（8） 一四ノ第二部

(三) 撃兵問題

本件ハ左ノ通り機械ス、

(A) 文那事變物資以來中國ニ於ケル駐兵及び撃
兵

中國ニ派遣セラレタル日本軍隊ハ譯北、
蒙脣地城反海南島ニ關シテハ日華開平和成
立公ニ、駐屯シ、適當期間ヲ經過スル迄撤
退セサルベク、兩餘ノ軍隊ノ撤退ハ平和成
立ト同時ニ日本及び中國ニヨリ實行セラル
ベシ。治安維持ノ為、二箇年以内ニ實行セ
ラルベシ。

(註) 「適當期間」ニ付米國當局ヨリ質問ア
リタル場合ハ、誠示二十五年ヲ目過トスル
モノナル旨ヲ以テ模然ト屬焉スルモノトス

(B) 駕印ニ於ケル駐兵及撃兵

日本國政府ハ駕印壓文那ノ領土主權ヲ尊重ス、現ニ駕印民文那ニ派遣セラレ居ル
日本軍隊ハ、公正ナル平和ノ確立スルカ、

2.

2

又ハ支那事變ニシテ解決スルニ於テハ又ヲ
撤去スベシ。

(四) 原則トシテハ又ヲ日本國、正式妥協事項（了
解事項ト又ハ其ノ他ノ事項タルトヲ開ハズ）
中ニ包含セシムルコトハ姦刀同道スルモノト
ス。

東京設「ワシントン」一九四一年十一月四日

栗原（○△）（蓋章）

第七二六號（四、三部）

二、記

(1) 通商無差別原則ニ付テハ、勿論地理的近接
ノ問題アルモ試方ハ從來、此ノ様ニ沿フ主
張ハ又ヲ訂正シ、無差別原則問題ヲ世界的
基盤ニ置キタルモノナルガ、米政府は當中
ニ何レカノ國力特定地域内ニ於テ所定ノ政
策ヲ取リ、他ノ一方ガ別ノ特定地域内ニ於
テ滿足的政策ヲ採ルコトハ實行シ易キコト
ナルベシトノ趣旨ノ記述アリ。右ニ従スル
モ何等反對ナカハケク、従ツテ本件ニ付テ
ヘビニテ容易ニ合意成立スルモノト信ス。

(2) 三國同盟ノ問題ニ付テハ辰次貴元ニ依レバ

米山國ハ武方銀次ニテ大体端足シ居ルヤノ
越アルニ付日清艦ノ解釋ヲ達ニシ大ハル意
圖ナキコトヲ一層國艦ニスルニ於テハ、本
音モ妥協ヲ見ルベキモノト信ズ。

(和)

東京發事並頃宛

一九四一年十一月四日

栗色（OA）（正念）

第七二六號（四ノ第四部）

(三) 誠兵向越ヘ取ハセテ國艦ナル論トアルヤモ知
レサルモ、武方ハ米國ガ不道徳地獄ヘノ戰ガ
陸兵ニ強ク反撃スルニ壓シ、占領地獄ヲ云ヘ
宣戦ノ実動ヲナシ、以テ其ノ疑惑ヲ解カント
スルモノナリ。

武方ハ之ヲ擬兵ト稱ス。陸兵ヲ以前トスルヨ
リハ例外トスル方米側ノ希望ニ附フベキモ、
結局ノ所此ハ開戦トナラサルベシ。陸兵期國
ニ識シテハ、國職ナル聲國ヲ懲罰サレタル際
ハ、從來常ニ駆隊ナル言辭ヲ以テ表ハシ未リ
タル所貴便ニ於テハ國家得ハ風リ不難底ニシ
テ然モ快適ナ言辭ニテ競曲ニ述べ、無類風陸
兵ハ永久陸兵ニヨル旨ヲ印象ッケル様御努力

六

相成瓦シ。之ヲ莫スハニ、甲矣ハ他ノ機業テ
越ヘラレタル三矣中ノ二矣ニ關シテハ全面的
ニ示行主張ヲ受諾セルモノニテ、最後ノ一篇
タル駐兵反ヒ撤兵問題ニ付テモ最大限ノ譲歩
ヲ爲セル次第ナリ。吾々ハ實ニ四年ノ間中國
ニ於テ一心ニ戰ヒ來リ、甚大ナル犠牲ヲ拂ヒ
タリ。

彼等又之ヲ承知セリ、然レバ此ニ關スル彼
等ノ主張ハ單ナル「天皇スル意見」ナリシナ
ルベシ。鬼モ角此ノ論ニ關シ之以上ノ譲歩ハ
國內的ニ不可能ナリ。依テ猶々御努力ノ上米
側ラシテ右ラ諒解セシメ道ニ交渉妥協ニ導ク
誠願望ス

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

ワシントン、二十五、四〇

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ

添附眞海ノ日本文電報ノ機密寫真ハ陸海軍兩管ノ
熱線セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ
テ傍受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ
ニシテテノ知リ且信ズル候リ正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻
譯スル爲メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

參謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE

カーラー・ダヴィッド・クラーク